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Abstract: This study deals with security issues in dynamical networked control systems. The
goal is to establish a unified framework of the attack detection stage, which includes the
four processes of monitoring the system state, making a decision based on the monitored
signal, disconnecting the corrupted subsystem, and operating the remaining system during
restoration. This paper, in particular, considers a disconnection-aware attack detector design
problem. Traditionally, observer-based attack detectors are designed based on the system model
with a fixed network topology and cannot cope with a change of the topology caused by
disconnection. The disconnection-aware design problem is mathematically formulated and a
solution is proposed in this paper. A numerical example demonstrates the effectiveness of the
proposed detector through an inverter-based voltage control system in a benchmark model.
Keywords: Detection algorithms, distributed detection, large-scale systems, networks, on-line
security analysis, system security,
1. INTRODUCTION
This study deals with security issues for physical net-
worked systems, which face challenges in ensuring a safe
and secure operation. In modern and future cyber-physical
systems, components are densely interconnected in both
information and physical layers and as a result once an
adversarial attack irrupts its effects propagate over a broad
range in the entire networked system. In fact, several
incidents have been reported and it covers a wide range
of applications including an attack on an uranium enrich-
ment plant, attacks on Ukrainian power plants, remote car
hacking, and unmanned aerial vehicle hacking, see Kush-
ner (2013); Lee et al. (2016); Miller and Valasek (2015);
Shepard et al. (2012).
For secure operation of physical systems, novel security
techniques in the physical layer are required aside from
the existing information security techniques because of
difference between the requirements of information sys-
tems and physical systems. For instance, patching and
frequent updates are not well suited for control systems
as mentioned in Ca´rdenas et al. (2011). Furthermore,
implementing security technologies in physical layers in
addition to information layers fits the notion of “defense
in depth” advocated in Kulpers and Fabro (2006), which
argues the importance of multiplication of protections.
When considering security in the physical layer we have
to handle dynamics of the system because in most cases
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inertia, or several counterparts, cannot be ignored in phys-
ical systems. In Dibaji et al. (2019), a survey paper on
security for dynamical systems from the control theoretical
perspective, the defense mechanism of physical systems
against attacks is classified into three stages: prevention,
resilience, and detection stages. The process of the detec-
tion stage is further divided into the four steps: monitor-
ing, decision, disconnection, and restoration steps. In the
monitoring step, the state of the operation is observed.
Based on the monitored signal, decision on attack injection
is made in the decision step. Then the attacked compo-
nents are disconnected for suppressing propagation of at-
tack effects. Finally, after removing the cause of the attack
the isolated part is reconnected. Traditionally, those steps
have separately been studied based on the assumption that
the steps are able to operate independently.
However, those steps should be discussed in a unified
manner especially for dynamical networked systems under
control, because unplugging some input ports would lead
to loss of the original function owing to disconnection
of feedback in controlled systems. For example, when an
attack is injected into one of the reference signals, simply
disconnecting the input port of the reference signal results
in deviation of all output signals from the reference. In
the worst case, stability of the system would be lost if
the signal under attack configures a closed-loop system.
Therefore, it is required to design the network system with
a protection system to be compatible with disconnection
and to discuss the entire security flow in the detection
stage in an integrated fashion.
The goal of this study is to establish a unified framework of
the detection stage. First, the system must be resilient to
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disconnection of a part of the networked system. In other
words, the system is needed to be able to continually oper-
ate even when disconnections happen as a reaction against
attacks. Since existing researches (e.g., Ishizaki et al.
(2018); Anderson et al. (2019); Qu and Simaan (2014);
Akhavan et al. (2019)) enable design of systems resilient
to disconnection, in this paper we suppose that the entire
system can be constructed to have the resilience property
to disconnection. Based on this premise, this paper treats
the design problem of a distributed attack detector com-
patible with disconnection. Conventionally, observer-based
residual generators, which monitor the state of the system
operation by comparing the ideal signal under the normal
operation and the actual measured signal, are designed
based on the system model with a fixed network topology.
The design policy leads to lack of the capability to handle
topology changes caused by disconnection. We mathemat-
ically formulate the disconnection-aware dynamical attack
detector design problem and propose a solution based on
retrofit control developed in Ishizaki et al. (2018, 2019).
The effectiveness of the proposed approach is illustrated
through a numerical example of power distribution net-
work systems.
Several related works that propose design methods of phys-
ical systems being secure throughout the entire detection
stage can be found. In Sasaki et al. (2015, 2017), the
authors have proposed fallback control. In the framework,
fallback operation is switched to as an incident response
of the control system where facilities are preferentially
protected and minimal system that can continue to op-
erate during cyber attacks. Although the attack detection
process in fallback control is achieved through a switched
Lyapunov function, it is difficult to find a switched Lya-
punov function for large-scale systems. A system design
method that can perform plug-and-play fault detection
and control-reconfiguration in a unified manner is pro-
posed in Riverso et al. (2016), the method of which can
possibly be applied to attack detection as well. Although
the existing study considers large-scale systems and the
proposed method is scalable, it requires a technical as-
sumption that interconnection signals between subsystems
are constrained in bounded sets. The assumption means
that each subsystem can be regarded as a decoupled sys-
tem with bounded disturbances and is not well suited for
stability analysis of strongly connected networked systems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we first
review security operation for dynamical networked sys-
tems. Then we provide a motivating example of power
distribution network systems to highlight the necessity
of a unified framework of the detection stage. Moreover,
the disconnection-aware distributed attack detector design
problem is mathematically formulated. We review retrofit
control, which is the key to solve the formulated problem
in Sec. 3, and subsequently, we provide a solution to the
formulated problem based on retrofit control. Sec. 4 pro-
vides a numerical example that illustrates the effectiveness
of the proposed method and Sec. 5 draws conclusion.
Notation We define a shorthand of a transfer function
G(s) = C(sI −A)−1B +D by[
A B
C D
]
:= G(s).
2. UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR ATTACK
DETECTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we review the security flow for dynamical
networked systems under attack through their mathe-
matical models. Then we provide a motivating example
highlighting the necessity of a unified framework of the
detection stage. Supposing that the system is resilient to
disconnection, we formulate the problem of distributed
attack detector design in which the distributed attack
detector can cope with topology variation caused by dis-
connection.
2.1 Security Operation for Dynamical Networked Systems
Consider a linear time-invariant interconnected system Σ
composed of N subsystems
Σi :
{
x˙i = Aixi + Livi +Biri + ai,x
wi = Wixi + Zivi + Uiri + ai,w
yi = Cixi + Eivi +Diri + ai,y
(1)
for i = 1, . . . , N with an interconnection vi =
∑
j∈Ni Mijwj ,
where xi, vi, wi, yi, ri denote the state, the interconnection
input, the interconnection output, the measurement out-
put, and the reference signal, respectively. The index set
associated with the neighborhood of Σi is denoted by Ni.
The exogenous inputs ai,x, ai,w, ai,y represent the effects to
the system behavior caused by the attack. For simplicity,
the entire interconnected system is assumed to be well-
posed throughout this paper.
Example: The system model can represent a wide range of
attacks, such as controller hijacking executed by Stuxnet,
see Falliere et al. (2011). Let us suppose that the ith
subsystem dynamics without attacks is represented as
x˙i = Aixi + Livi + Biri + ui where ui is a control
input generated by a feedback controller implemented
through programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Stuxnet
overwrites the control algorithm in PLCs and the resulting
control input ui becomes a malicious input αi, whose
effects to the system behavior is modeled by (1) with
ai,x := αi − ui.
Defense mechanisms of physical systems can be catego-
rized into three stages: prevention, resilience, and detec-
tion as in Dibaji et al. (2019). In this study, we pay
attention to the detection stage, the process of which
includes monitoring the state of the system operation for
detection of attacks, making a decision of attack injection,
disconnecting the part under the attack for suppressing
propagation of the influence of the attack, and restoring
the normal operation. The process of each step, which
exploits techniques in fault detection and isolation (Ding
(2013)) is reviewed in the following.
As the first step of the detection stage, residual genera-
tion is performed permanently during the operation. The
residual (t) is generated by comparing the ideal output
signal yˆ(t) under the normal operation and the actual
measurement output y(t) by (t) := y(t) − yˆ(t), which is
normally zero when no attack is injected if measurement
noises can be ignored. The ideal output signal yˆ(t) is
generated through an observer with the information on
the input signals and the dynamical system model during
normal operation. For instance, for the interconnected
system composed of (1), a distributed observer, each of
whose subobservers interacts an estimated interconnection
signal wˆi to each other, can be built as
Σˆi :

xˆi = Aixˆi + Livˆi +Biri +Hi(yi − yˆi)
wˆi = Wixˆi + Zivˆi + Uiri
yˆi = Cixˆi + Eivˆi +Diri
vˆi =
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj
(2)
with appropriate observer gains Hi. At the next step,
based on the instantaneous value of the residual (t),
decisions are made by a testing method, such as the chi-
squared test (Mehra and Peschon (1971)), the generalized
likelihood ratio test (Willsky and Jones (1976)), and the
sequential hypothesis test (Ca´rdenas et al. (2011)). When
a decision of existence of attack is made, isolation, namely,
identifying the location of the attack (Pasqualetti et al.
(2015)) is performed as well. Then for eliminating influence
of the attack the input port is isolated by disconnecting the
facilities under attack, e.g., turning off the switch of the
interaction between the plant and the controller. Finally,
the system is restored to regain its original function by
removing the source of the attack and reconnecting the
islanded components.
2.2 Motivating Example
This subsection provides a motivating example that
demonstrates operation failures owing to disconnection of
the components under attack. We consider low-voltage
power distribution networks as shown in Fig. 1. In the dis-
tribution network system, each customer has a distributed
generation (DG) with which an inverter is equipped as
a controller. The purpose of the control is to regulate
the voltage magnitudes vk to given reference values vk,
which is identically set to be 230 [V] (for the detail of the
modeling, see Sec. 4). As a residual generator, we design
a distributed observer (2) with certain observer gains Hi
designed to guarantee stability of the error dynamics for
the original system Σ.
DG with
inverter
substation
customer 1 customer 2 customer 
DG with
inverter
DG with
inverter
disconnection
Fig. 1. Infrastructure of a low-voltage distribution network
system.
Let us observe behaviors of the system under some discon-
nections caused by attacks. The distribution network has
five customers and we suppose that an attack is injected
into the ith DGs for i = 3, 4, 5. As a reaction against the
attack, it is supposed that the DGs under the attack are
disconnected at the time t0 = 5. Fig. 2 illustrates the time
series of the voltage magnitudes under the disconnection
at t0 = 5. It can be confirmed that the voltage magni-
tudes in the remaining parts are kept to be around the
setpoint even after the disconnection. This result implies
that the distribution network system can work well under
the disconnection and is resilient to disconnection caused
by attacks. On the other hand, Fig. 3 illustrates the time
series of the residual with a distributed observer (2) under
disconnection at t0 = 5, which is represented by the dash-
dot line. It can be observed that, although the estima-
tion error converges to zero before the disconnection, the
error diverges after the disconnection. The instability is
arisen from the inadequate choice of the observer gains Hi,
which are designed only for the original system without
disconnection. The resulting distributed observer is not
compatible with network topology change caused by the
disconnection.
As shown in the example, the conventional attack detec-
tor would lead to loss of monitoring function owing to
instability of the distributed observer when disconnection
happens. Therefore, it is required to develop a novel attack
detector design method that can cope with disconnection.
Moreover, since the system dynamics is changed by the
disconnection, all processes that utilize system model in-
formation have to be designed taking the system varia-
tion into account explicitly. Based on the observation, we
consider developing a unified framework for the detection
stage in the next subsection.
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Fig. 2. Time series of the voltage magnitudes under dis-
connection at t0 = 5.
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Fig. 3. Time series of the residual with a distributed
observer (2) under disconnection at t0 = 5.
2.3 Disconnection-aware Attack Detector Design Problem
The motivating example above has shown the necessity of
a novel framework for the security flow:
(0) design process: designing the interconnected system
Σ to be resilient to disconnection caused by attacks,
(1) monitoring process: monitoring the local time series of
the residual i(t) generated by comparing the actual
measurement signal yi(t) with the ideal signals yˆi(t)
created through a distributed observer,
(2) decision process: making a decision of attack and the
attacked place at each detector based on the local
monitored residual i(t),
(3) disconnection process: disconnecting the ith subsys-
tem where an attack is detected, namely, wi is set to
be zero,
(4) operation and restoration process: operating the re-
maining interconnected system during restoration.
Clearly, at least the first three processes from the top of
the list are required to be compatible with disconnection.
Our goal is to establish a unified framework for the entire
security flow.
In this study, we regard stability under disconnection as
resiliency of the networked system. We treat the resiliency
of the original system as a premise. The following assump-
tion is made.
Assumption 1. For any I ⊂ {1, . . . , N}, the remaining
interconnected system ΣI is internally stable where ΣI
is given by the interconnected system composed of the
subsystems Σi for i ∈ I with wj = 0 for j /∈ I in (1).
Assumption 1 states that the stability of the intercon-
nected system itself is guaranteed for any disconnection
with respect to the interconnection between the subsys-
tems. Although the detail of designing the interconnected
system satisfying Assumption 1 is not focused on in this
paper, we provide brief description of two possible ap-
proaches for the design method in the following. The first
approach is given by simply applying existing methods
in the design process for designing a dynamical intercon-
nected system to be resilient to disconnection, see Ishizaki
et al. (2018); Anderson et al. (2019); Qu and Simaan
(2014); Akhavan et al. (2019). In this approach the points
to be disconnected are naturally determined and subsys-
tems Σi are given as the designed components. In the other
approach, for a given system Σ, we choose the interconnec-
tion points to be disconnected such that Assumption 1 is
satisfied. The pick of connecting points leads to the system
description as an interconnected system of Σ composed
of the subsystems Σi. The policy of deciding intercon-
nection points can specifically be given when the entire
system is built by a negative feedback interconnection of
passive systems (Brogliato et al. (2006)). In this case,
Assumption 1 is satisfied simply choosing each element
as a subsystem. If the original system does not have such
a property, connecting points can be determined through
off-line simulation in advance.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of designing
a distributed observer to generate yˆ in the monitoring
process as a preliminary step. The difficulty here is that,
even if the dynamics of the error signal e := x− xˆ with the
distributed observer in the form of (2) with fixed observer
gains Hi is stable, the remaining error signal dynamics
under some disconnection is possibly destabilized with the
original observer gains, which are compatible only with the
original fully interconnected system Σ.
We formulate the dynamical attack detector design prob-
lem as follows.
Problem 1. Under Assumption 1, design a distributed
observer
(xˆi, yˆi, wˆi) = Oi(yi, {wˆj}j∈Ni , ri)
such that xˆI → xI and yˆI → yI as t → +∞ for any
I ∈ {1, . . . , N} under any initial conditions when the
attack signals are zero, where xˆI , yˆI are the states and
outputs of OI , which is given by the distributed observers
composed of Oi for i ∈ I with wˆj = 0 for j /∈ I.
The implicit assumptions on the problem are as follows:
• The network topology of the distributed observer is
the same as that of the original interconnected system
and
• the input signals wˆj and ri are not fabricated by the
attacker.
Note that a naive approach to guarantee stability under
network topology variation caused by disconnection is to
not utilize feedback of the error signal, namely, setting
Hi = 0 for any i in (2). Then the stability of the error
signal dynamics is preserved owing to Assumption 1 be-
cause it is equivalent to the stability of the original system.
However, the poles of the error signal dynamics cannot be
assigned without feedback and hence early attack detec-
tion cannot be performed with the naive approach. Note
also that, if we represent the stability condition as linear
matrix inequalities (LMIs), the number of the constraints
reaches 2N and hence it is practically impossible to solve
the problem via the naive LMI approach.
Remark: White-box attacks (Chakraborty et al. (2018)),
namely, attacks with full knowledge about the system ar-
chitecture are out of focus at the present stage. For exam-
ple, if the attacker can arbitrarily choose the attack signals
ai,x and ai,y, it can be readily performed to generate an
attack signal that cannot be detected by any possible de-
tectors. Furthermore, even without ai,y if there exists zero-
dynamics in the dynamical system undetectable attacks
can be constructed as shown in Pasqualetti et al. (2015).
Since these attacks cannot be coped with by detector
design alone, such problems are not treated here.
3. PROPOSED DISCONNECTION-AWARE ATTACK
DETECTOR DESIGN METHOD
In this section, we propose a design method of a distributed
observer that meets the requirement in the formulated
problem. First, we briefly review retrofit control, developed
in Ishizaki et al. (2018, 2019), which plays the key role to
solve the problem. Subsequently, we propose a solution
based on the retrofit control.
3.1 Brief Review of Retrofit Control
Retrofit control is a newly developed controller design
method the main purpose of which is to achieve modular
design of large-scale interconnected control systems. In the
framework, each subcontroller is supposed to be designed
only using the model information of the subsystem to
which the subcontroller is attached. For the controller
design it is naturally required that the function held
by the entire interconnected system must be preserved
even with introduction of subcontrollers in a sequential
manner. Retrofit control provides a specific controller
design method that fulfills this requirement.
The schematic diagram of the interconnected system to
be controlled in the retrofit control framework is depicted
in Fig. 4 (a). It is assumed that the model information
of G = (Gwv, Gwu, Gyv, Gyu), the subsystem associated
with the subcontroller to be designed, is available while
the model information of G, the other part of the inter-
connected system, is unavailable. We suppose that the in-
terconnected system without the controller K, denoted by
Gpre, stably operates and consider attaching K to improve
the control performance while preserving the stability. To
mathematically handle the problem, we first consider the
following set
G := {G : Gpre is internally stable.}
and provide the definition of retrofit controllers as follows.
Definition 1. The controller K in Fig. 4 (a) is said to be a
retrofit controller if the entire feedback system in Fig. 4 (a)
is internally stable for any G ∈ G.
(a) Entire interconnected sys-
tem to be controlled in the
retrofit control framework.
(b) Equivalent system explic-
itly representing the Youla pa-
rameters Q and Q.
Fig. 4. Equivalent block diagrams of the closed-loop sys-
tem.
A necessary and sufficient condition for retrofit controllers
is given as follows:
Proposition 1. Assume that G in Fig. 4 (a) is stable. Then
K is a retrofit controller if and only if GwuQGyv = 0 and
Q is stable where Q := K(I−GyuK)−1 denotes the Youla
parameter with respect to K for Gyu.
The interpretation of the conditions is given as follows.
Fig. 4 (b) is obtained by transforming the system Fig. 4 (a)
with the Youla parameters Q and Q, which correspond
to K and G, respectively. Since Q is an arbitrary stable
transfer matrix, the condition is necessary and sufficient
for internal stability. For the complete proof, see Ishizaki
et al. (2019).
3.2 Proposed Design Method
We propose a disconnection-aware distributed attack de-
tector design method as a solution to Problem 1 based on
retrofit control. Let us consider a distributed observer in
the following form:
Oi :

˙ˆxi = Aixˆi + Li
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj +Biri + µi
wˆi = Wixˆi + Zi
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj + Uiri + νi
yˆi = Cixˆi + Ei
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj +Diri
(3)
where µi and νi are artificial signals injected into the sub-
observer. It should be noted that the distributed observer
has the form of (2) if we choose µi = Hi(yi−yˆi) and νi = 0.
Let ei := xˆi − xi be the local state estimation error. Then
the dynamics of ei is represented as
Ei :

e˙i = Aiei + Li
∑
j∈Ni Mijωj + µi
ωi = Wiei + Zi
∑
j∈Ni Mijωj + νi
ψi = Ciei + Ei
∑
j∈Ni Mijωj
where ωi := wˆi − wi and ψi := yˆi − yi denote the local
estimation errors in terms of the interconnection signal and
the measurement output, respectively. Obviously, Prob-
lem 1 is equivalent to the stabilization problem of the in-
terconnected systems composed of Ei under disconnection
as long as the distributed observer is assumed to have the
form in (3). Therefore, we consider designing a stabilizing
controller Ki : ψi 7→ (µi, νi) in the following discussion.
Now we take a particular I ⊂ {1, . . . , N} and let EI
be the interconnected system composed of Ei for i ∈ I.
Then the block diagram of EI from the perspective of
the ith subsystem Ei can be represented by Fig. 5 where
EI\{i} is the interconnected system composed of Ej for
j ∈ I \ {i} and φi :=
∑
j∈Ni Mijωj . From Assumption 1
and Proposition 1, if Ki satisfies the condition for retrofit
controllers for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then the resulting
distributed observer with the controllers Ki meets the
requirement of the problem.
Fig. 5. Block diagram of EI for a particular I from the
perspective of Ei where φi :=
∑
j∈Ni Mijωj .
The difficulty here is that the procedure to design a retrofit
controller for Ki is not obvious. The following theorem, the
main result of this paper from a theoretical perspective,
provides a retrofit controller design method for Ki.
Theorem 1. Design Ki as
Ki :
{
χ˙i = Aiχi + µi
µi = Hiψi
νi = −Wiχi
(4)
with an observer gain Hi such that Ai +HiCi is Hurwitz.
Then Ki satisfies the condition for retrofit control.
Proof. Define Qi := Ki(I −Gi,ψ(µ,ν)Ki)−1 with
Gi,ψ(µ,ν) :=
[
Ai [I 0]
Ci [0 0]
]
.
First, as long as Qi is stable, the condition for retrofit
control in Fig. 5 is represented by Gi,ω(µ,ν)QiGi,ψφ = 0
where
Gi,ω(µ,ν) :=
[
Ai [I 0]
Wi [0 I]
]
, Gi,ψφ :=
[
Ai Li
Ci Ei
]
.
Clearly,
Gi,ω(µ,ν)Ki = 0 (5)
is a sufficient condition. We show that (4) satisfies (5) and
also that Qi is stable.
The transfer matrix Gi,ω(µ,ν) can be rewritten by
Gi,ω(µ,ν) =
[[
Ai I
Wi 0
]
I
]
.
and the transfer matrix of Ki is given by
Ki =
 Ai Hi[ 0
−Wi
] [
Hi
0
]  =
 I[ Ai I
−Wi 0
] Hi.
Thus, we have (5). Moreover, since
Gi,ψ(µ,ν)Ki =
[
Ai Hi
Ci 0
]
,
if Ai +HiCi is Hurwitz then Qi is stable. 2
Fig. 6 depicts the block diagram of Gi,ω(µ,ν)K and its
internal structure where Gi,ωφ := Wi(sI − Ai)−1Li + Zi.
The effect of µi to ωi is canceled out by νi and it results
in ωi = Gi,ωφ
∑
j∈Ni Mijωi in which the transfer matrix is
invariant under the control. Owing to the invariance, sta-
bility of the entire interconnected system can be preserved.
Note that, because the effect of the control inputs to the
internal state ei is not canceled out, the response of the
state varies under the control. Note also that there always
exists an observer gain Hi such that Ai +HiCi is Hurwitz
because the pair (Ai, Ci) is detectable from Assumption 1.
Fig. 6. Block diagram of Gi,ω(µ,ν)Ki and its internal
structure where Gi,ωφ := Wi(sI −Ai)−1Li + Zi.
Solution: In summary, the structure of the proposed
disconnection-aware distributed dynamical attack detector
is given by
Oi :

˙ˆxi = Aixˆi + Li
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj +Biri + µi
wˆi = Wixˆi + Zi
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj + Uiri + νi
yˆi = Cixˆi + Ei
∑
j∈Ni Mijwˆj +Diri
Ki :
{
χ˙i = Aiχi + µi
µi = Hi(yˆi − yi)
νi = −Wiχi
(6)
with observer gains Hi such that Ai +HiCi is Hurwitz for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which gives a solution to Problem 1.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we examine how the proposed attack
detector works through a numerical example of a power
distribution network system. For security issues in power
distribution network systems, see Teixeira et al. (2015);
Isozaki et al. (2016).
The infrastructure of the distribution network is shown
in Fig. 1 where v′0 represents the substation bus voltage
magnitude that is assumed to be a given constant 230 [V].
Lines are represented by a series impedance Zk = Rk+jXk
or Z ′k = R
′
k + jX
′
k and each customer has a DG with an
inverter. For each customer, the received voltage level is
vk and the voltage level at the point of connection with
the distribution line is v′k. At the kth connecting point,
Sk = Pk + j(qg,k − qc,k) and S′k = P ′k + jQ′k denote
the power supplies from the DG and the distribution line,
respectively. We employ the LinDistFlow model developed
in Baran and Wu (1989) for power flow and voltage drop
equations represented by
S′k = S
′
k+1 − Sk
v′2k+1 = v
′2
k − 2β′k+1(S′k+1)
v2k = v
′2
k + 2βk(Sk)
where βk(Sk) := RkPk + XkQk and β
′
k(S
′
k) := R
′
kP
′
k +
X ′kQ
′
k. The operation of the kth inverter is to regulate the
voltage magnitude vk by generating the reactive power
qg,k. As the inverter dynamics, we employ the first-order
model from the deviation of squared voltages between
the reference value and the actual measured value to the
generated reactive power, which is represented by
q˙g,k = − 1
τk
qg,k +
1
τk
κk(v
2
k − v2k)
where τk is the time-constant of the kth inverter’s response
and κk is the droop gain as in Chong et al. (2019). As
a specific distribution network, we consider a benchmark
European low-voltage distribution network in Strunz et al.
(2014) as in Chong et al. (2019). Although the detail is
omitted, the distribution network system can be regarded
as an interconnected system by defining the subsystem
Σk as each branch and the DG with an inverter and the
interconnected signals vi and wi as the squared voltage,
active power, and reactive power. Moreover, it can numer-
ically be confirmed that the interconnected system satisfies
Assumption 1.
We now suppose that an attack is injected into the power
distribution network system. The k0th customer’s DG is
assumed to be attacked and the squared voltage reference
signal v2k0 is fabricated. As stated in Sec. 2, we consider
black-box attacks and the attack signal is modeled as a
simple step function beginning at ta. Accordingly, the fab-
ricated squared reference voltage signal v2f,k0 is represented
by v2f,k0(t) = v
2
k0
(t) +aι{t:t≥ta}(t) where a is a scaler value
that represents the amplitude of the attack and ιΩ denotes
the indicator function of the set Ω.
For monitoring process, we design the proposed dis-
tributed attack detector. Let Σi be the subsystem com-
posed of the ith customer and branch for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
The internal state and the interconnection signal of Σi are
qg,i and (v
′2
i , S
′
i), respectively. We suppose that each qg,i
is measurable at each subobserver Oi, namely, yi = qg,i,
for attack detection. Finally, the distributed observer is
designed based on the structure (6) where observer gains
Hi are determined based on the state-feedback linear
quadratic regulator design method under certain weights.
Let us compare the time responses of residuals generated
with the simple distributed attack detector without error
feedback, namely, (2) with Hi = 0, and the proposed
distributed attack detector. Fig. 7 shows the time response
of the normalized residuals for the attack created by a = 1
and ta = 1 with k0 = 4, where the normalized factor
γ is determined by the direct-current (DC) gain of the
transfer function from the attack to the residual. Let us
suppose that 0.95 is taken as the baseline for the decision
making, which is depicted by the broken line in Fig. 7.
When the value of the normalized residual exceeds the
baseline, the decision of attack injection is made. Then the
times of attack detection are t = 3.5 and t = 1.5, which
are represented by dash-dot lines, with the no-feedback
detector and the proposed detector, respectively. It can be
observed that the detection time is much earlier owing to
the estimation error feedback.
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Fig. 7. Time series of normalized residuals k0/γ with
the distributed attack detector without error feedback
and the proposed distributed attack detector where
a = 1, ta = 1, and γ is set to be the DC gain of the
transfer function from the attack to the residual.
The time series of each customer’s voltage are shown
in Fig. 8 where (a) is obtained with the no-feedback
distributed detector and (b) is obtained with the proposed
distributed detector. In this example, the attack is made
with the parameters a = −5 × 104 and ta = 1 with
k0 = 4. The decision on disconnection in terms of Σi is
made when |a|i(t)/γ > 0.95. As shown in Fig. 8, owing to
the early detection achieved by the proposed detector the
voltage deviations with respect to non-attacked customers
are suppressed compared with the naive detector.
Finally, we confirm that the stability of the error dynamics
is guaranteed under disconnection in the same setting of
Fig. 3. Fig. 9 illustrates the time series of the residual with
the proposed attack detector where the observer gains are
the same as the ones used in Fig. 3. It can be observed
that the stability is preserved even after the disconnection
owing to the proposed structure.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered detection process of de-
fense mechanism in physical layers towards attack-resilient
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(a) No-feedback distributed detector
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(b) Proposed distributed detector
Fig. 8. Time series of each customer’s voltage under the
attack injected into the k0th subsystem from ta = 1
where Σi is disconnected when the attack is detected
at Oi.
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Fig. 9. Time series of the residual with the proposed
distributed observer under the disconnection.
cyber-physical systems. In particular, we have paid at-
tention to the disconnection-aware attack detector design
problem and proposed a novel design method based on
retrofit control. As illustrated in the numerical example,
the proposed attack detector enables early detection of
attacks while maintaining the error dynamics to be stable
even under network topology change caused by disconnec-
tion.
The important direction of future works is to develop an
entire framework for the detection stage, including the
decision step, the disconnection step, and the operation
and restoration step. For instance, while in the numerical
example we employ a simple criterion for making a decision
with a fixed baseline, the criterion is desirable to be
dependent on the time instant, the system model, the
supposed attack, and also the variable network topology.
Moreover, worst-case analysis against white-box attacks is
considered to be another direction of future works.
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